In this paper, an autonomous and distributive demand-side management based on Bayesian game theory is developed and applied among users in a grid connected micro-grid with storage. To derive that strategy, an energy consumption of shiftable loads belonging to a given user is modelled as a noncooperative three-player game of incomplete information, in which each user plays against the storage unit and an opponent gathering all the other users in the micro-grid. Each player is assumed to be endowed with statistical information about its behavior and that of its opponents so that he can take actions maximizing his expected utility. Results of the proposed strategy evaluated by simulating, under MATLAB environment, a connected micro-grid with storage device evidence its efficacy when employed to manage the charging of electric vehicles. 38 Journal of Power and Energy Engineering H. Ininahazwe et al. CPP [3], and RTP schemes [4] that provide economic incentives to consumers to efficiently schedule their energy and get financial benefits. In that context, the authors in [5] have proposed various electricity market models.
Introduction
Demand-Side Management (DSM), which is the management mechanism of demand side in the next generation of the grid [1] , seeks to address various problems such as efficient energy usage, improvement of the demand profile, reduction of the operation cost, shift energy consumption to reduce PAR, and balance power supply and demand [2] . Several previous works have been studied in order to implement and motivate users to participate in DSM program. Recently, research has concentrated on pricing mechanism which principally comprises ToU pricing, How to cite this paper: Ininahazwe 
System Model
In this study we consider a low voltage MG consists of { } 1, , , , n n N ∈     residential users, where N =  , equipped with RE (e.g., solar PV panel). Users are connected each other and to the public utility via power line. Residential consumers gathering in the MG community share their surplus of energy by storing it in a shared ESU managed by a controller, and act as a single entity when interacting with the public utility. Each user has two types of power loads:
ULs and SLs. ULs are appliances that can be turned on at arbitrary instants of the day, i.e. their energy consumption schedule is strictly constrained; that category contains appliances such as refrigeratorfreezer, heating, electric stove and lighting [9] . SLs are considered as appliances whose activation can be softly scheduled within specified interval of time during the day.
Furthermore, each household in the MG is assumed to be equipped with a SM which controls and monitors the energy sharing and the electricity consumption.
Each household's SM also exchange, with other SMs via data network, some information about the RE forecasts, prices of energy, the customers' demands at every instant and can get information of energy available in the storage unit. We assume that the communication between MG and power utility is supervised by a MSM, i.e. an upgraded SM adapted for operating at high power and serving as Figure 1 .
At every instant of time t, each household n ∈  has following sets of power: the renewable power produced by his own RESs, the power demand from his appliances (SLs and ULs). The real time power exchanged by each customer with the MG is evaluated as follows:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) r s n n n l t l t l t = + .
Equation (1) gives the instant power ( ) 
represents respectively the maximum power that can be discharged from the battery and the maximum power needed for charging the battery.
The overall power monitored by the MSM (see Figure 1 for details) is derived as follows; let ( ) T l t be that power at an instant t of time; it is expressed as Figure 1 . Architecture of the MG [10] . 
That overall power is also constrained to: ( ) inj pu P : the negative maximum power that can be injected in the main grid; ( ) abs pu P
: the maximum positive power that can be absorbed from the public utility, and the previous expressions lead to the following inequality:
The maximum power that can be injected to the publicutility is a negative value of the summation of power generated by all RESs and the maximum power that can come from the battery when discharging; it is expressed as follows:
Demand-Side Management Based on Bayesian Game Theory
In this Section a brief description of our game model is provided and, on the basis of this model, a mixed strategy for the activation of SLs is developed.
Rules and Description of the Game
The SM installed at each prosumer's premise is considered as player (taken as player 1 in the following) behaving in a selfish and rational manner, capable of turning the load on or off. Furthermore, as this SM competes with the rest of the MG community in the exploitation of the energy resources available, we can model other 1 N − prosumers as a single aggregated opponent called player 2 and the shared battery as player 3 because it will be competing with all the prosumers for charging and discharging.
The power flow for player 2 is defined as the difference between the overall power available in the MG and power for player 1 and player 3; it can be expressed as follows:
which verify the following inequality:
where ( ) Those previous MG parameters have led us to a simplified three players game instead of a complicated game of 1 N + players. Our 3 players game model can be used to describe the interactions between each player with the rest of the MG community.
From the every player's point of view, there is a payoff associated to each of its actions. The evaluation of payoffs gives a full description of the game. For our work we will assume that:
• For prosumers, the action of keeping SLs off is associated with a payoff equals to 0 for the corresponding prosumer without taking into account the power absorbed or generated by other prosumers and the battery.
• The activation of SLs will entail a variation in the payoff for the corresponding prosumer because it will change the operating conditions of the MG, which means that the associated payoff n EP will depend on the expected (statistical) future consumption/generation of the whole MG community.
• The battery (player 3)'s payoff will depend on its charging and discharging efficiency. In other words, its payoff will decrease as the number of charging cycles gets larger; we assume that the battery's life will be reduced as a function of its charging cycles which will influence its capacity.
The derivation of the expected payoffs n EP in the following sections of this work will take into account:
1) A pricing model for power shared between players and the MG; means that each power exchange will be paid or rewarded with a certain amount of monetary units.
2) Specific statistical information available at each prosumer's SM and the battery's controller.
Economic Model of the Smart Micro-Grid
The pricing model takes into account any power exchange between players and the MG. A provision of service, accounted by a power exchange between player and the MG, involves a variation in the total amount of virtual currency owned by the corresponding player. In our work, such variation depends on the MG's condition and the cost function.
We assume in the following that it depends on the operating condition of the MG represented by a state variable that can take two values. Those values describe the normal (briefly state 0) and stress (briefly state 1) operating conditions. To bring out the characteristics of those states, we consider a positive power threshold that verifies the following inequalities:
( ) ( ) for the stress state
The normal state represents the regular operating condition of the MG, whereas the stress state corresponds to high consumption of power which may end up by some risk of blackout.
Cost Function
The derivation of the cost function is given by:
The cost function expresses, for given players' powers, the cost (if negative) or reward (if positive) for the considered player. The first term of the Equation (11) represents the cost associated with the power absorbed by player 1 from the MG, the second one represents the gain coming from the power supplied to the MG and the third one is a fairness term referring to the immediate power exchange between player 1 with that of player 2 and player 3, and the coefficients , In our work, the weight functions appearing in the right hand side of Equation (11) are given by the following expression:
In the Equation (12), X can take two values: A (absorbing) and G (generating), j can also take two values: 0 (normal state) and 1 (stress state).
Statistical Information Evaluated by Each Player
As Bayesian game theory is concerned, we assumed in (2) the availability of statistical information at every SM and controller; then player 1 is provided with three different probability density functions (pdfs); ( ) ( ) 1) The first order probability density function (pdf) ( ) ( )
which refers to the overall power absorbed by the MG or supplied to the public utility without taking into account DSM.
2) The first order pdf ( ) ( ) ; r n l f x τ of the instantaneous portion ( ) ( ) r n l t of ( ) n l t (see Equation (1)).
3) The first order pdf ( ) (3)).
In order to derive the payoffs function . The number of prosumers forming player 2 influences the statistical behavior of ( ) j n l − in a way that they may exhibit different behaviors when speaking of power consumption/ generation compared to player 1 and player 3. We will assume in the following that the joint probability can be factored as follows:
It is interesting to mention that in order to estimate the above indicated pdfs, specific learning algorithms have to be developed for a real world implementation of the suggested strategy.
Firstly, the pdf ( ) ( ) ; j T l f x τ can be evaluated by the MSM and then its representation distributed to all players. To achieve that, the MSM must be provided with the exact knowledge of past consumption/generation of players. After receiving the necessary data about users and the weather predictions, the MSM exploits them using improved machine learning tools such as regression models to reliably forecast the statistical behavior of the MG. The assumption
can be adopted when the number of N prosumers is big.
Secondly, the approximation of the pdf ( ) ( ) 
Derivation of the Expected Payoff
Knowing the cost function
given in Equation (11) (5) and (7)): 
Next, the expect payoff n EP associated with the ON action of player 1 is defined as the difference between the expected cost related to the activation of the considered load at ( ) ,0 n sl t t = and that associated with keeping it off, which leads to: 
We can further simplify the equation by substituting the upper limit of the second integral appearing in the right hand side of Equation (16)
; this simplification is justified by the fact that the integral function takes negligible values in the interval that has been added in the integration domain, which yields: 
We finally replace Equation (17) in Equation (15) which leads to the following equation after some manipulations: 
The parameter in Equation (19) that has a discount factor ω ( 0 1 ω < < ). This consideration is justified by the fact that:
1) The game is replayed by player 1 every s T s until th sl n SLs is activated or the maximum activation time limit is reached;
2) For each shiftable load, the activation interval is scheduled during ( ) n l N slots; which means that the activation time interval for the considered load is:
3) The density cost function 
In our considered game, player 1 attempts to maximize his own expected payoff n EP . For that reason, the optimal pure strategy can be formulated as follows: In our work, we did not adopt the strategy given by Equation (22) 2) When multiple SLs are simultaneously activated by the n th prosumer, they need to be properly and efficiently scheduled.
These remarks and considering previous work on load management have led us to developing a mixed strategy. It will be part of the following section.
Mixed Strategy for the Game
In the proposed game, player 1 replays the game at instants (23) will be written as follows after factoring:
We can derive the activation probability from Equation (24) which gives:
is the activation probability to be selected at each trial to get the probability of success equals to ( ) n s P .
The objective of our mixed strategy is to adjust the activation probabilities , n n sl sl t t is given by the following equation: 
Discussion on the Error signal

Steps of the MG Bayesian Game Strategy
The implementation of our strategy follows many steps that are summarized in 3) The energy available in the MG is shared between the three players on the basis of probabilistic mechanism. It may happen an instant when the scheduled power for SLs is not sufficient. In that case, the MSM is supposed to broadcast a disconnection message of specific portion (if not all) of active SLs to avoid overload risks.
4) The reference power r P which is selected by the MSM and broadcasted to all prosumers, plays an important role because its change in value modifies the equilibrium of the MG. The value of that threshold is practically fixed on the basis of the expected consumption over the whole day.
Numerical Results
This chapter describes the results obtained by simulating the DSM strategy for a MG collecting 100 N = residential prosumers sharing a battery capable of generating 300 KW for 1 hour. Analysis of the results to evaluate the effectiveness of the Bayesian DSM strategy is also presented.
Assumptions for the Simulation
The following assumptions have been made in all our simulations:
1) Each prosumer in the MG has made a contract to not exceed a maximum supply half of the load demand (see Table 1 ) for one hour without taking into account power fluctuations or voltage drops.
Overall Powers Comparison
A sample function of the overall power absorbed by the MG from the public utility if it is positive or generated by the MG and injected in the grid if is negative is represented in Figures 6-8 for the considered three days. Three cases, corresponding to the operating conditions of the MG without the battery, with the battery charging and with the battery discharging have been considered. In both cases, the performance of the proposed DSM strategy has been analyzed for SLs (PHEVs). In particular, in Figure 6 Similarly, in Figure 7 , the simulation is carried on the MG with a battery charging from the total power available in the MG. The overall power in the MG ( ) T l t (blue curve) was also compared to the overall power absorbed by the PHEVs (red curve) in the absence (upper figure) and in presence (lower figure) of the developed DSM strategy.
Finally, the simulation of the micro grid was done taking into account the discharge of the battery. Figure 8 These results evidence that the scheduling of PHEVs may substantially lower the peaks in load demand due to SLs.
As we can see, the operation of the MG in the presence of the battery presents a significant reduction of peaks in the load demand thanks to the compensation in power provided by the battery. This conclusion is also supported by use of DSM and a shared battery in the MG brings between 40% and 42% on average in the improvement of the MG PAR. Note that this improvement is substantially better compared to that provided by the use of the Bayesian game theory developed in [7] , where 34% improvement of the PAR has been reached. (red squares) and the battery charging or discharging. Note that the line that connects the two squares referring to a specific user is blue (red) if the first value is greater (smaller) than the second one.
Evaluation of the Expected Payoff
Especially Figure 10 shows the gap between the realization of the values of the mentioned expected payoffs { } , 1, 2, ,100 n EP n =  evaluated for the activation of the PHEV owned by the n th prosumer without considering the battery.
The realization of the values of the above mentioned expected payoffs { } , 1, 2, ,100 n EP n =  when the battery is charging is shown in Figure 11 .
The last case in the evaluation of the expected payoffs { } , 1, 2, ,100 n EP n =  related to the activation of the PHEV has been simulated when the battery is discharging; which is exemplified in Figure 12 .
These results show that, in the MG community, 70, 64, and 73 prosumers respectively for the MG operates without battery, with battery charging and finally with battery discharging, benefit from the DSM strategy in terms of monetary 2) −0.57 mu in the presence of DSM and −0.66 mu in its absence and with the battery charging;
3) −2.23 mu in the presence of the DSM and −4.44 mu in its absence and with the battery discharging.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, a game theory based on DSM strategy relying on statistical information about prosumer consumption, the charging/discharging of a shared battery and the overall consumption of a MG has been developed. The proposed strategy helps to mitigate fluctuations in the load demand when applied to a MG with SLs and preserve privacy for users. Numerical results obtained when using the strategy to the MG and considering a shared battery in a multi user scenario, evidence a significant reduction in the MG PAR for the management of the recharge of PHEVs considered as shiftable load owned by each user. Furthermore, the strategy allows a substantial satisfaction for the activation of those SLs when the community storage is contributing to the power supply in the MG. Future work concerns the management of the community storage by autonomously scheduling the charging and discharging of the energy storage units in a MG.
